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Transparency in local government 
management: a study of its determinants 
Nuno Ribeiro – Sónia Nogueira – Ivone Freitas* 
Abstract: 
Transparency of public management is fundamental in bringing citizens closer to 
public managers, with this being considered universally as an element of good 
governance. 
The main aim of this study is to identify the factors determining transparency in 
public management of Portuguese local authorities. Using the Municipal 
Transparency Index of 2013 and 2014, socio-demographic, political and economic-
financial variables are studied for the universe of 308 Portuguese local authorities, 
by testing the previously formulated research hypotheses in the light of agency 
theory. 
The results show that transparency in public management of Portuguese local 
authorities is determined by size, the number of individuals aged between 15 and 74 
who use the internet, unemployment rate, financial autonomy and net debt.  
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1 Introduction  
Transparency in public management, besides being an obligation for managers and 
politicians, contributes to greater citizen/voter participation in exercising public 
functions (Tavares and Rodrigues, 2012). It is fundamental that they have 
transparent information allowing them to assess management efficiency, but also 
that they identify with the system. 
The new form of action in local government, namely regarding accountability to 
voters/tax-payers, means of communication, controlling bodies and other 
stakeholders in accompanying governments’ activities, increases the attention paid 
to transparency and its determinants. 
The principal objective of this study is to contribute to the scientific literature, 
seeking to answer the following research question: “what are the determining 
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factors of transparency in Portuguese local authority management?” The main 
purpose is to identify, for the Portuguese local authority situation, the factors 
determining the level of transparency. To achieve this aim, the results of the 
recently developed Municipal Transparency Index (MTI) for the years 2013 and 
2014 are used. 
Following this introduction, the article is structured in 3 sections. Section two 
relates agency theory with accountability and transparency. The third section 
presents the empirical analysis, stating the hypotheses and variables, how the data 
will be treated, and the results and discussion of the hypotheses. The last section 
presents the main conclusions of the study. 
2 Agency theory, accountability and transparency 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract through 
which one or more people (the principal – capital holder) hire another person (the 
agent – manager) to perform a service or work in their name. In this contractual 
relationship the principal delegates some decision-making authority to the agent, a 
fact that gives rise to conflicts of interest due to the separation of ownership and 
control. The agent does not always act in the principal’s interest, which means 
agency costs are incurred, resulting from adopting monitoring mechanisms and 
residual losses. 
The principal-agent dilemma involves a relational conception of accountability, 
bearing in mind the matter of information (Ferejohn, 1999). The problem of 
accountability is related to the problem of delegation, since representative 
democracies mirror a relation of authority between the person who delegates and 
the one who is delegated. The principal delegates to the agent the power to carry 
out something in the former’s interest, and it is the agent’s duty to act in the 
principal’s interest. 
Agency theory has been widely applied to the business situation, but in recent 
decades it has been used increasingly in other contexts, particularly in 
representative democracy (Ferejohn, 1986). Considering the agency theory 
approach to representative democracy, voters (principal) elect politicians/leaders 
(agents) to represent their interests through the policies proposed by governments 
and the guidance given to Public Administration to carry them out. In addition, by 
financing public activities, tax-payers also delegate to their representatives the 
decision to allocate public resources.  
From the agency theory perspective, the lack of transparency can create an 
advantage for political decision-makers in achieving their objectives: agents 
(politicians/leaders) can have their own interests that do not always maximize their 
voters’ well-being. Therefore, and according to the above theory, accountability 
takes place in the scope of an electoral democracy, according to a minimalist 
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conception of the democratic process fundamental for the institutionalization of 
accountability which consists of reducing the information deficit between 
principals and agents by enhancing transparency.  
Alt, Lassen and Skilling (2001) indicate that transparency reduces the information 
asymmetries between political agents and citizens/voters. The authors suggest two 
ways to diminish this problem: i) inform voters about the actions taken by elected 
politicians (Ferejohn, 1999), or ii) facilitate coordination in budget results between 
the bodies alternating in power.  
The concept of transparency emerges as linked to the information economy, where 
the citizen is seen as an investor and consumer of public goods. In the view of 
Ferejohn (1999), the principal invests their resources in the action carried out by 
the agent (politicians/leaders), hoping for a return on the investment made. The 
balance in the relationship between the principal (voters/tax-payers) and the agent 
(politicians/leaders) depends on the existence of more transparent entities that are 
able to reduce the uncertainty of the investment (Ferejohn, 1999). As mentioned 
above, transparency maximizes accountability by allowing a reduction of 
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, thereby ensuring a 
system of possible accountability through reducing public bodies’ secrets. 
According to this approach, for agency theory, transparency strengthens 
accountability in the scope of the information economy, with the citizen being 
seen as a consumer of public goods, i.e., financing public sector activities. 
3 Factors determining transparency in Portuguese local authority 
management 
3.1 Research hypotheses 
Based on the literature review (Ingram and Copeland, 1982; Christianes, 1999; 
Ferejohn, 1999; Traunmuller, 2001; Reddick, 2005; Alt, 2006; Piotrowski and Van 
Ryzin, 2007; Christoph, Schaltgger and Torgler, 2007; Rueda, 2007;García and 
García, 2008; Gallego-Álvarez, Rodríguez-Domínguez and García-Sánchez; 2010; 
Guillamón, Bastida and Benito, 2011; Lourenço, Jorge, Sá and Rolas, 2011; 
Esteller-Moré and Otero, 2012; Mendes, 2012; Pires, 2012; Alegre, Peñas, Santias 
and Boubeta, 2013; Vicente, Benito and Bastida, 2013; García-Sánches, Frías-
Aceituno and Rodríguez-Domínguez, 2013; Batalha, 2014; Sol, 2013; Tavares and 
Cruz, 2014, and Sedmihradská, 2015), as well as the precepts of agency theory, a 
set of research hypotheses was formulated, relating the level of transparency with 
certain variables considered as potentially explanatory factors of this. For better 
understanding, the hypotheses analysed were grouped taking into consideration 
socio-demographic, political and economic-financial factors. 
Table 1 presents the various hypotheses, the variables to be studied, data source 
and the expected sign for each. 
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Tab. 1: Research hypotheses, variables and expected sign 
Research 
hypothesis 




The level of transparency is greater 







The level of transparency is greater 
the greater the number of people aged 







The level of transparency is greater 






There is a relationship between the 







The level of transparency is lower the 





The level of transparency is greater in 







The level of transparency is greater 







The level of transparency is greater 






The level of transparency is greater 







The level of transparency is greater 
the higher the local authority’s net 






DIM - Logarithm of the inhabitants residing in the local authority.  
INTER1574 - Logarithm of the number of people aged between 15 and 74 who 
use the internet. 
ESCOL - Percentage of population with higher education according to the total 
population of the local authority. 
IENV - Number of people aged 65 and over for every 100 people under the age of 
15. 
TXDESEMP - Number of unemployed per 100 active people. 
FGOV - Dummy variable in which it takes the value '1' if the political party that 
manage the municipal executive obtained majority (more than 50.1% of the votes), 
otherwise it assumes the value '0 (zero)'. 
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IDEOL - Dummy variable with a value '1' when the municipal executive is of right 
parties ideology and '0 (zero)' in the opposite case. 
PARTELEI - Number of voters in the municipal elections, divided by the voters 
registered in the electoral rolls. 
AUTFIN - Own revenues divided by total revenues. 
ENDLIQ - Differences between liabilities, in whatever form, including 
borrowings, leasing contracts and debts to suppliers, and assets, namely the cash 
balance, bank deposits, treasury apllications and credit claims. 
In relation to the dependent variable, the MTI was developed in 2013 by 
Transparency and Integrity, Civic Association (TIAC) and measures the degree of 
local authorities’ transparency through analysis of the information available to 
citizens on their websites. Specifically, the index measures the transparency of 
Portuguese local authorities according to information on their composition, 
functioning and management, as provided on the municipal websites. The index 
does not measure accessibility, intelligibility, the quality and assumptions of 
information provision, or corruption. The MTI is made up of 76 indicators 
consisting of dummy variables with the value of ‘1’ when a certain item of 
information is provided on the local authority site, or ‘0 (zero)’ if not. 
These indicator are grouped into seven dimensions: 
A. Information about the organization, social composition and functioning of the 
local authority (18 indicators); 
B. Plans and Planning (13 indicators); 
C. Taxes, Fees, Tariffs, Prices and Regulations (5 indicators); 
D. Relationship with society (8 indicators); 
E. Transparency in Public Procurement (10 indicators); 
F. Economic and financial transparency (12 indicators); 
G. Transparency in Urban Planning (10 indicators). 
3.2 Data treatment 
To determine the relationship between each of the independent variables and the 
MTI, so as to study the various hypotheses defined, a multivariate analysis is 
performed using the STATA program. 
As the linear regression model has been widely used (e.g., Guillamón, Bastida and 
Benito, 2011; Vicente, Benito and Bastida, 2013 and Tavares and Cruz, 2014) in 
defining econometric models that explain the determinant factors of local authority 
transparency, the same method is chosen in this study. More specifically, the 
multiple linear regression model is applied by the Ordinary Least Squares method, 
due to considering that various (independent) variables may explain the local 
authority transparency index. 
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According to Marôco (2010), estimation of the linear regression model can only be 
performed if certain assumptions are fulfilled. Therefore, various tests will be 
carried out to complete that analysis. 
Considering MTI as the dependent variable, and the different variables already 
mentioned as independent, the following model will be studied: 
 
MTI α DIM INTER1574 ESCOL IENV TXDESEMP
FGOV IDEOL PARTELEIT AUTFIN
ENDLIQ 
        (1) 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
The results of estimating the model are now presented, with the global model 
(SOCDEM_PLO_ECOFIN) including the socio-demographic, political and 
economic-financial variables. In the partial models, each group of factors was 
estimated individually. Therefore, Model 1 is related to socio-demographic factors 
(SOCDEM), Model 2 to political factors (POL) and Model 3 to ecomomic-
financial factors (ECOFIN). 
Analysis of Table 2 reveals that for most variables the partial models present 
results that are quite consistent with estimation of the global model. In this 
context, an analysis will now be made of the results of that model 
(SOCDEM_POL_ECOFIN), finding that it presents an R2of 0,214. 
The explanatory variables of the model express 21,4% of the variations occurring 
in the MTI. It is noted that the explanatory power is not very high, but agrees with 
the results obtained by Guillamón, Bastida and Benito (2011) and Tavares and 
Cruz (2014), respetively 29% and 25%. 
The results of the F test (10,605) = 34,23 allow the conclusion that, for a 1% level of 
significance, there is sufficient statistical evidence to state that the regressors 
present values different from zero and as a whole explain satisfactorily the 
variations found in the MTI. 
Considering the previous results, tests were made to analyse a possible violation of 
the model’s assumptions. Concerning multicollinearity, no variable was found to 
present a VIF value above 10, which shows non-violation of the assumption. Nor 
are the 1/VIF values, i.e., of tolerance, close to zero, showing that the regression 
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Tab. 2:  Results of the Multiple Linear Regression Model (MTI) 
MTI MTI MTI MTI 
Variable SOCDEM POL ECOFIN SOCDEM_POL_ECOFIN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DIM 2,237*** 1,588**  
(3,60) (2,52)    
INTER1574 1.653*** 1,668*** 
(3,09) (3,15)    
ESCOL 0,340** 0,184    
(2,43) (1,10)    
IENV -0,000866 0,000777    
(-0,16) (0,15)    
TXDESEMP -0,361** -0,411*** 
(-2,56) (-2,83)    
FGOV 1,704 1,199    
(0,83) (0,58)    
IDEOL -0,624 -0,792    
(-0.71) (-0,95)    
PARTELEI -0,411*** -0,0577    
(-8,60) (-0,92)    
AUTFIN 24,90*** 7,079*   
(10,17) (1,75)    
ENDLIQ 0,00224*** 0,00302*** 
(4,37) (5,46)    
_cons -1,076 57,17*** 24,84*** 6,861    
(-0,20) (18,04) (25,28) (0,90)    
F 18,61*** 56,16*** 25,90*** 34,23*** 
R2 0,205 0,103 0,142 0,214 
N 616 616 616 616 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
To test for heteroscedasticity, the White test was used. As the test statistic is 77,52 
above the p-value = 0,1032, it is concluded that the assumption of 
heteroscedasticity was not violated. 
Autocorrelation of errors was carried out using the Durbin-Watson test, reaching 
the conclusion that the model does not suffer from error autocorrelation. 
The results obtained reveal that for a maximum level of significance of 10%, the 
variables of DIM, INTER1574, TXDESEMP, AUTFIN and ENDLIQ present 
statistical significance. 
The results obtained will now be discussed, based on agency theory, due to 
considering that voters (principal), with their votes, elect politicians/leaders 
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(agents) to represent their interests through policies proposed by governments and 
orientations given to Public Administration to carry them out. 
As there is information asymmetry between agents and the principal, based on the 
results obtained, it is important to discuss which socio-demographic, political and 
economic-financial factors determine transparency in public management of local 
authorities. 
Of the ten research hypotheses formulated, the results obtained allow us to validate 
five.  
Validation of H1 corroborates the idea that municipal authorities are more 
transparent in larger councils. This result agrees with those obtained by Gallego-
Álvarez, Rodríguez-Domínguez and García-Sánchez (2010), Guillamón, Bastida 
and Benito (2011), Esteller-Moré and Otero (2012), Sol (2013), Mendes (2012), 
Pires (2012), Batalha (2014) and Sedmihradská (2015).  
The results obtained also confirm that the greater the population with access to the 
internet, the greater local authority transparency, and so H2 is also validated. Easy 
access to the internet increases the possibility of access to information about the 
local authority. In this context, citizens seem to be closer to local authorities. 
The hypothesis related to the unemployment rate is also corroborated, and so H5 is 
also validated. This result is consistent with that obtained by Alegre et al. (2013), 
Tavares and Cruz (2014) and Batalha (2014). There seems to be the underlying 
idea that, on one hand, the more precarious the council’s economic situation, the 
greater the temptation for local authorities to conceal this. On the other hand, the 
unemployed population may have many other personal worries, and is therefore 
less concerned about obtaining information about the local authority, outside the 
area of employment. 
In relation to economic-financial factors, the results allow validation of the two 
hypotheses defined. Therefore, H9 is validated, corroborating the opinions of 
Tavares and Cruz (2014), Alegre et al. (2013) and Vicente, Benito and Bastida 
(2013). Here, we find that local authorities with greater financial autonomy, which 
may even be able to charge more taxes, feel the need to inform citizens, and so are 
more transparent. This fact may contribute to citizens not feeling they are paying 
high taxes as they may have a precise idea of municipal management. 
The results obtained also allow validation of H10, corroborating those obtained by 
Rueda (2007), García and García (2008), Pires (2012) and Batalha (2014). Here, 
there seems to be statistical evidence confirming that greater net debt leads local 
authorities to be more transparent. There is a general opinion that such a result can 
be explained by local authorities wanting to pacify citizens.  
Finally, it is underlined that no results were found to enable validation of the 
hypotheses related to political factors (H6, H7 & H8). 
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4 Conclusion 
Recent studies in the field of Public Administration have highlighted the role of 
transparency in making information available to citizens, allowing them to 
participate in the political process, as well as promoting accountability, improving 
the quality of government decision-making and helping to anticipate and lessen 
corruption. The information provided can reveal private interests that may go 
against the collective interest and hold actors responsible for all decisions and 
measures taken or omitted.  
This study contributes to scientific knowledge, by investigating the determinants 
of local government transparency, seeking to answer, in the specific case of the 
Portuguese situation, the following research question: “what are the factors 
determining transparency in public management of Portuguese local authorities”. 
In particular, the intention was to identify which factors determine the level of 
transparency in public management of Portuguese local authorities. To this end, a 
set of hypotheses were tested, considering the 308 Portuguese local authorities. 
Use was made of the results of the recently developed MTI for 2013 and 2014. 
The study was based on agency theory, considering the agency relationships 
applied to voters/tax-payers (principal) and politicians/leaders of local 
administration (agent). 
In general terms, the results obtained indicate as explanatory determinants of 
transparency in public management of Portuguese local authorities: population 
size, individuals aged between 15 and 74 who use the internet, the unemployment 
rate, financial autonomy and net debt. No results were obtained allowing 
validation of the hypotheses related to level of education, aging index or political 
factors (form of governance, political ideology and political/voter participation).  
Finally, it is highlighted that this research aimed to make a significant contribution 
to the literature studying the determinants of transparency in public management 
of Portuguese local authorities, largely due to the limited number of studies carried 
out in this area, and particularly, considering the MTI.  
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